Main Character Syndrome: The Philosophical Dangers of Romanticizing Your Life
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Summary
What This Article Is About
Anna Gotlib, philosophy professor at Brooklyn College, examines main character syndrome (MCS)—the tendency to view one’s life as a story where one stars centrally while others are relegated to supporting roles or non-player characters (NPCs). Triggered by a near-collision with a driver oblivious to other traffic, Gotlib analyzes how MCS manifests across society: TikTokers pushing aside people “ruining” selfies, subway riders blasting videos without headphones, treating others as philosophical zombies (David Chalmers’s concept of beings physically identical to humans but lacking conscious experience). As a narrativist, Gotlib argues selves are created through shared stories requiring “empathetic openness” to others’ moral agency and emotional states, but MCS narratives deny this interdependence. While narrativism supports social media as legitimate narrative form, Gotlib distinguishes: healthy narratives emphasize multivocality and mutual intelligibility, while MCS offers “harmful, isolating, solipsistic, amoral” stories creating what feminist philosopher Hilde Lindemann calls “spaces of moral damage.”
MCS proliferates through multiple channels: social media hashtags viewed millions of times selling the idea that “becoming the heroes of their lives is the only thing that matters,” films depicting hero’s journeys (Hunger Games, Spider-Man) reinforcing “there can be only one” monomyth, and psychologist Michael Wetter’s observation that technology enables “immediate widespread self-promotion” satisfying “natural human desire to be recognized and validated.” Influencers like Ashley Ward advocate “romanticising your life” to avoid relegating oneself to “NPC-dom—a nobody, a nothing, a mannequin.” But MCS extends beyond social media into politics (presidents claiming “I alone can fix” crises), academia, and especially longtermism/effective altruism—where philosophers like William MacAskill argue prioritizing future generations’ wellbeing justifies treating current humans as NPCs whose “suffering might be the only thing to save the future,” with elites considering themselves “justified in manipulating us so that we do the right thing.” Gotlib argues MCS threatens two fundamental human experiences: connection (reducing relationships to “me/not me” binaries creating “anxiety-producing shallow consumerist competition”) and love (requiring vulnerability and non-instrumental regard impossible when others become abstract entities). Drawing on Forster’s “Only connect!” epigraph, Camus’s declaration that morality’s only duty is love, Frankfurt’s view of love as dangerous vulnerability, Levinas’s alterity (otherness forcing us from solipsism), and Fromm’s love as active practice requiring “humility, courage, faith and discipline,” Gotlib contends MCS exhibits what Aleksandar Fatic calls “moral incompetence”—inability to experience empathy, solidarity, loyalty, or love. Rather than offering solutions via “listicles,” she invokes Campbell’s “dark night of the soul,” suggesting we must sit with anonymity, recognize incompleteness, resist equating performance with authentic connection, and acknowledge per Beckett: “You’re on earth, there’s no cure for that!”
Key Points
Main Takeaways
Others Reduced to NPCs
Main character syndrome treats others as non-player characters—predetermined algorithmic beings, philosophical zombies lacking conscious experience, “insignificant ghosts,” “human-shaped furniture”—denying their moral agency, perspectives, and full humanity in service of MC’s narrative.
Narrativist Paradox Revealed
While Gotlib supports narrative identity theory—selves created through shared stories requiring multivocality and mutual intelligibility—MCS represents “wrong kinds of stories”: harmful, solipsistic, amoral narratives creating Hilde Lindemann’s “spaces of moral damage” destructive to shared moral universe.
Technology Amplifies Ancient Tendencies
While narcissism and solipsism predate internet, social media makes self-promotion “easier, cheaper, more socially acceptable”—constant curation through filters/angles enabling monomyth performance before always-available audiences, with influencers advocating “romanticising your life” to avoid NPC-dom’s “grey insignificant” fate.
Longtermism as Extreme MCS
Effective altruists and longtermists (MacAskill, Bostrom) prioritizing future generations’ wellbeing justify “NPC-ification of any humans alive at the moment”—utilitarian calculus permits manipulating current populations to “do the right thing,” discounting present agency/value while main character atop scheme possesses “moral perception” bringing vision to fruition.
Connection Undermined by Competition
MCS reduces human relationships to “me/not me” binaries, transforming potential co-creators into rivals competing in “zero-sum game of winners and losers,” creating “anxiety-producing shallow consumerist competition” where interdependently created identities disappear leaving people “alone, unheard, unseen—perhaps un-personed.”
Love Requires Vulnerability MCS Denies
Drawing on Camus (“only duty is to love”), Frankfurt (love as dangerous vulnerability), Levinas (alterity’s otherness forcing connection), and Fromm (love as active practice), Gotlib argues MCS exhibits Fatic’s “moral incompetence”—inability experiencing empathy/love when treating others as abstract instrumental entities rather than vulnerable equals.
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Article Analysis
Breaking Down the Elements
Main Idea
MCS as Systematic Moral Failure Threatening Relational Selfhood
Gotlib’s central philosophical argument positions main character syndrome not as superficial social media trend but profound moral failure threatening relational, interdependent nature of human identity and ethical life. As narrativist believing “selves are something we create together, through shared stories,” she contends healthy identity formation requires empathetic openness to others’ moral agency, multivocality, mutual intelligibility—precisely what MCS systematically denies by treating others as NPCs, philosophical zombies, or “human-shaped furniture.” Particular contribution lies in synthesizing narrative identity theory with critique of contemporary self-fashioning, showing how same technological/cultural forms enabling narrative self-creation produce pathological versions when divorced from reciprocity, demonstrating MCS’s incompatibility with major ethical traditions while avoiding prescriptive moralizing.
Purpose
Philosophical Diagnosis of Cultural Pathology
Gotlib diagnoses main character syndrome as cultural pathology requiring philosophical rather than merely sociological or psychological analysis, demonstrating how contemporary self-fashioning practices undermine conditions for ethical life. Purpose is simultaneously diagnostic (identifying MCS manifestations across social media, entertainment, politics, academia), critical (revealing incompatibility with narrative identity theory, love, connection), and pedagogical (teaching readers recognizing how everyday practices embody deeper philosophical failures). Positions herself as insider-critic: as narrativist defending social media narratives generally, must explain why some prove morally damaging despite supporting narrative identity, creating theoretical tension driving argument. Concludes with Beckett rather than prescriptions, signaling purpose isn’t offering self-help but cultivating philosophical awareness enabling recognition of MCS’s stakes.
Structure
Anecdote → Definition → Theory → Examples → Stakes → Non-Resolution
Opens with dramatic personal anecdote—near-collision with oblivious driver—establishing accessible entry before introducing MCS concept and defining terms (NPCs, p-zombies, main character energy). Early sections catalog manifestations establishing phenomenon’s breadth before pivoting to theoretical framework: narrativism’s claim selves require shared stories. Middle sections explore apparent paradox—if narrativism defends social media, why worry about MCS?—resolved by distinguishing narrative types. Systematically expands scope from social media to entertainment, individual behavior to institutional manifestations, culminating in extended longtermism/effective altruism critique as extreme MCS form. Latter third pivots to philosophical stakes: connection and love, deploying Forster, Camus, Frankfurt, Levinas, Fromm demonstrating ethical traditions’ convergence condemning MCS. Crucially refuses prescriptive conclusion, invoking Campbell’s “dark night” and Beckett’s absurdist resignation.
Tone
Philosophical Seriousness Balancing Accessibility and Critique
Gotlib maintains philosophically serious yet accessible tone—employing technical concepts (p-zombies, alterity, theory of mind, moral incompetence) while explaining clearly for general readers, avoiding both academic jargon and popularizing condescension. Opens with self-deprecating humor establishing relatable voice before deploying sophisticated analysis. Tone toward MCS balances description and judgment: cataloging manifestations without moralistic finger-wagging while letting conceptual analysis reveal ethical stakes. Phrases like “perhaps more annoyingly, ‘main character energy'” inject wry humor preventing preachiness while maintaining critical edge. Becomes more urgent addressing philosophical stakes—”We must see others as fully human”—using italics for emphasis without hectoring. Treats philosophical authorities respectfully but not reverentially. Conclusion’s tone shifts toward measured pessimism, combining absurdist humor with existential seriousness suggesting philosophical problems sometimes demand acknowledgment rather than resolution.
Key Terms
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Tough Words
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Extremely self-centered; believing only one’s own mind is certain to exist; viewing everything exclusively from one’s perspective without genuine regard for others’ independent reality.
“MCS offers the wrong kinds of stories: harmful, isolating, solipsistic, amoral… Only the main character, his perspective, his story and his solitary self, matter.”
Presence of multiple voices or perspectives; quality of incorporating diverse viewpoints and narratives rather than privileging single authoritative voice; condition of shared discourse among equals.
“Narrative approaches to morality and identity centre both speaking and hearing—sharing and uptake—emphasising the importance of multivocality, of shared discourse, of mutual intelligibility.”
State of being other or different; radical otherness of another person that cannot be fully comprehended; philosophical concept describing how others’ fundamental difference challenges self-referential solipsism.
“Emmanuel Levinas argued that ‘alterity’—the uncertainty born of the otherness of others—is the beginning of all morality. It might also be the beginning of all love.”
Mutually dependent on one another; existing in relationship where each relies on others; describing condition where separate entities require each other for meaning, identity, or functioning.
“It is destructive to views of human beings as fundamentally relational and interdependent… They point toward the moral significance not just of one’s own stories, but of the narratives of others as guides to understanding the fundamental interdependence of human identities.”
Single archetypal narrative pattern underlying hero’s journey across cultures; Joseph Campbell’s concept of universal story structure where protagonist overcomes challenges, transforms, and returns triumphant.
“This hero’s journey, this monomyth, is on full display in The Hunger Games movies… Media, social and otherwise, has made it easier, cheaper and, importantly, more socially acceptable to act out our MC monomyths.”
One who supports narrative identity theory; philosopher or theorist believing personal identity and moral understanding are constructed through stories we tell about ourselves and hear from others.
“As a philosopher and a narrativist, I am an unabashed supporter of the view that selves are something that we create together, through shared stories.”
Reading Comprehension
Test Your Understanding
5 questions covering different RC question types
1According to Gotlib, as a narrativist who supports narrative identity theory, she must defend all forms of social media narratives equally since they all contribute to self-creation through shared stories.
2How does Gotlib argue that longtermism and effective altruism exemplify main character syndrome?
3Which sentence best captures Gotlib’s explanation of why genuine love is incompatible with main character syndrome?
4Evaluate these statements about philosophical concepts Gotlib uses to critique main character syndrome:
David Chalmers’s “philosophical zombie” or p-zombie is a being physically identical to normal humans but lacking conscious experience—for MC-identified individuals, others become “perhaps, just so many zombies.”
Levinas’s concept of “alterity” describes how recognizing others’ fundamental sameness and identity with ourselves forms the foundation of all morality and love.
Aleksandar Fatic’s “moral incompetence” refers to inability experiencing moral emotions like empathy, solidarity, loyalty, or love—connecting MCS and narcissism through their rejection of interdependence and mockery of meaningful connections.
Select True or False for all three statements, then click “Check Answers”
5What can be inferred about why Gotlib concludes with Beckett’s “You’re on earth, there’s no cure for that!” rather than offering practical solutions to main character syndrome?
FAQ
Frequently Asked Questions
NPCs (non-player characters) originate from gaming—characters “with predetermined (or algorithmically determined) set of behaviours controlled by the computer” rather than possessing independent will, serving as helpers, obstacles, or props in the main character’s quest. Philosophical zombies (p-zombies) are David Chalmers’s thought experiment: beings “physically identical to a normal human being” but lacking “conscious experience”—if a p-zombie laughs, “it’s not because it finds anything funny” but through pure behavioral imitation. While NPCs describe functional role (supporting MC’s narrative), p-zombies describe ontological status (appearing human without inner life). Both concepts converge in how MC-identified individuals experience others: as beings lacking genuine agency, consciousness, or moral standing equal to the MC’s, existing merely to populate the MC’s world rather than inhabiting their own centers of experience and value.
Gotlib invokes feminist philosopher and bioethicist Hilde Lindemann’s framework that “some narratives can create spaces of moral damage that are detrimental to the identities of both the speaker and his audience, and destructive to the possibility of a shared moral universe.” MCS narratives exemplify this moral damage by: (1) damaging the speaker’s identity—reducing self-understanding to solipsistic monomyth incapable of genuine connection or love, producing “anxiety-producing shallow consumerist competition”; (2) damaging audience identities—treating others as NPCs denies their moral agency and full personhood, relegating them to “insignificant ghosts” or “human-shaped furniture”; and (3) destroying shared moral universe—eliminating conditions for mutual intelligibility, interdependence, and reciprocal recognition necessary for ethics. The damage operates structurally rather than individually: MCS narratives don’t merely express bad values but systematically undermine narrative conditions (multivocality, shared discourse) enabling moral intelligibility itself, creating what Gotlib calls “harmful, isolating, solipsistic, amoral” stories incompatible with relational selfhood.
Gotlib quotes Fromm’s The Art of Loving defining love as artistic practice where “individual love cannot be attained without the capacity to love one’s neighbour, without true humility, courage, faith and discipline.” Fromm argues love requires “an activity, not a passive affect”—”in order to truly love, it is insufficient to merely feel; what is required is responsibility for the care of the beloved.” MCS contradicts this on multiple levels: (1) treating love as passive affect—seeking “feeling, a vibe,” wanting to be adored without active care-taking; (2) lacking humility—positioning oneself as singular hero rather than recognizing interdependence; (3) avoiding vulnerability—refusing “openness to mutual vulnerabilities” love demands; (4) instrumentalizing others—viewing people as means (NPCs serving MC’s narrative) rather than ends requiring responsibility. Gotlib concludes: “Yet MCS denies us the ability to do exactly that—to genuinely, humbly love anyone or anything. To the conquering hero, all interactions are transactional, all awe self-directed.” Love as active practice requires exactly what MCS systematically refuses: non-instrumental regard, vulnerability, reciprocity, and care.
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This is an Advanced-level philosophical essay requiring sophisticated comprehension across multiple dimensions: understanding narrative identity theory and its paradoxes (how narrativism can support social media while condemning MCS), tracking deployment of philosophical concepts (p-zombies, alterity, theory of mind, moral incompetence, utilitarian calculus) and their application to contemporary phenomena, recognizing structural arguments about how practices undermine their own conditions (MCS destroying interdependence narrative identity requires), synthesizing ethical traditions (Kant’s categorical imperative, Levinas’s alterity, Camus’s love, Frankfurt’s vulnerability, Fromm’s love as practice), following extended critique of longtermism/effective altruism demonstrating MCS in ostensibly altruistic frameworks, and appreciating why philosophical diagnosis concludes with existential acknowledgment (Beckett) rather than practical solutions. Success requires comfort with abstract argumentation, ability to see how everyday behaviors embody deeper philosophical failures, understanding distinctions between healthy and pathological versions of same practice (narrative self-creation), and capacity for meta-level reflection on how cultural forms shape ethical possibilities. The essay presumes educated general readership familiar with cultural criticism and comfortable with philosophical reasoning without requiring specialized training in academic philosophy.
“Theory of mind” refers to recognizing “that we experience other people as having the same kind of mental states that we do, rather than playing bit parts in the monomyth of our lives.” This psychological-philosophical concept involves attributing consciousness, intentions, beliefs, desires, and perspectives to others as real and independent as one’s own—understanding others as subjects rather than objects. Gotlib argues “The MCS narratives lack” theory of mind because main characters fundamentally fail to recognize others’ equivalent subjectivity: treating them as NPCs (predetermined algorithmic beings), p-zombies (behaviorally human but lacking consciousness), or “human-shaped furniture” serving MC’s narrative. This lack manifests as “incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty, or love” (Fatic’s “moral incompetence”), producing Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” to narcissism—both MCS and narcissism “reject our interdependence,” making “mockery” of meaningful connections “into a virtue.” Without theory of mind, others never register as equally conscious, equally valuable, equally deserving of moral consideration—they remain props rather than persons.
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